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The IWT and the UNWC: Commonalities and Differences

Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi1
ABSTRACT
Amid global water scarcity and a surge in population, leading nations have started racing
to occupy freshwater resources around the world. While there remains no international
agreement applying universally worldwide, almost all major international watercourses
and powerful nations remain out of the scope of any sort of legal obligation. Bilateral and
multilateral treaties have become the governing legal framework to regulate freshwater
utilization. In this context, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC) and the Draft Articles on the
Law of Transboundary Aquifers (DALTA) play a significant role, serving not only as the
guiding documents to form treaty laws or agreements, but also as customary international
law in situations where there is no available regional legal framework. These instruments
have achieved this accredited status by developing universally acclaimed principles,
obligations, and duties on co-riparian states and aquifer states, that in their core senses are
equitable, juridical, and impartial. These principles and obligations are flexible and
accommodate diverse evolving aspects of water apportionment. Accordingly, this paper
has been devised to set out the international law of freshwater. Herein, significant
implications, such as how this legal framework has been developed, are explained and
annotated with intrinsic principles. The principle of the equitable and reasonable
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utilization of international watercourses, and the obligation not to harm other concerned
states, will form the underlying emphasis in this paper. The significance of the regional
legal agreement, that is, the IWT, will be briefly explored in comparison with the
UNWC, considering the principles, obligations, and duties that are universally acclaimed
and, more importantly, that are established by the UNWC.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The international watercourses of the Indus river basin are acknowledged to be one of the
greatest canal systems in the world, accommodating 20 million hectares of irrigable lands
for agrarian purposes.2 India, China, and Pakistan are its major co-riparian states, sharing
most of its water, and China is an upper riparian state to India in the same way that India
is an upper riparian state to Pakistan.3 While China manages its sources of water flows,
India remains the prime riparian to manage water flows through its headworks, and
Pakistan only shares its basins. Afghanistan holds 6 percent of the watercourses of the
Indus rivers, China holds 8 percent, India holds 39 percent, and Pakistan holds 47 percent.4
The partition of Hindustan in 1947, which bifurcated the enormous state into Pakistan and
India, made complex geological demarcations; the headworks of the Pakistani irrigation
system lie in Indian-occupied Kashmir, which remains an area disputed between the hostile
neighboring states.5 Consequently, to resolve the conflicting interests, in 1960 the World

2

ASHOK SWAIN, MANAGING WATER CONFLICT: ASIA, AFRICA & THE MIDDLE EAST 46

(2004).
3

IMAGINING INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN, 198

(Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016).
4

BJORN-OLIVER MAGSIG, INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW & THE QUEST FOR COMMON

SECURITY 185 (2015).
5

Hemant Kumar Padhiari & Vishwa Ballabh, Inter-State Water Disputes and the

Governance Challenge, in GOVERNANCE OF WATER: INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES &
POLITICAL ECONOMY 174, 179 (Vishwa Ballabh ed., 2008).
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Bank brokered a water sharing treaty between India and Pakistan, which is known as the
Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).6 Through this treaty, the six major rivers—the Indus, Ravi,
Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, and Beas—along with many other smaller tributaries, were
equitably allocated for the unrestricted use of their respective states.7
In more recent times, the surge in population in both countries has amplified water
requirements for consumptive as well as for nonconsumptive usages.8 India has repeatedly
violated the treaty by installing storage and power production facilities on the western
rivers, which were allocated to Pakistan for its exclusive and unrestricted use.9 India
categorizes these violations as sincere necessities by arguing that, since the IWT is almost
60 years old, it does not cater for other contingent aspects of water apportionment, so it is
crucial to amend and modify the IWT.10 In this context, it becomes appropriate to note the
modern aspects that should be encompassed in devising an international water
apportionment treaty, and whether the IWT accommodates or respects these aspects within
its prescribed procedures, principles, and duties.
To explore the international legal framework of established principles and obligations, it is
suitable to review its progression and its contextual impetuses. All human beings rely on
fresh water, and only 0.0044 percent of all water globally comes from rivers and 10.85

6

BRIG V.P. MALHOTRA, SECURITY & DEFENCE RELATED TREATIES OF INDIA 273 (2010).

7

The Indus Waters Treaty art. 2-3, India-Pak., Sep. 19, 1960, 126 U.N.T.S. 6032.

8

See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 3, at 59.

9

GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT 70 (2007).

10

SATISH KUMAR, INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY ANNUAL REVIEW 2013 (2014).
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percent from shallow groundwaters that are accessible and drinkable. The rest of the water
worldwide is not safe for drinking purposes or is inaccessible, such as seawater and waters
in glaciers or deep underground.11 With a 1.11 percent annual growth rate in population,12
natural water resources are finite in their capacity to cater for human needs. Rivers often
have regional transboundary basins, and for the same reason nations often share rivers with
other nations.13 Amid growing water usage for domestic, industrial, irrigation, power
production, and storage purposes, a race for water navigation, storage and runoff projects
is emerging. This in turn leads to conflicts over water among co-riparian states over
safeguarding their national water interests.14 These interests are not only indispensable to
guarantee the necessity of life but also critical for national economic security.
It is difficult to believe that there is no international unanimity over any set of rules and
regulations for sharing transboundary fresh river waters.15 No established framework
restricts or restrains countries from exploiting the waters of lower riparian countries by
constructing massive storage facilities or by navigating river waters away from their course

11

Adam Nieman, All the Accessible Fresh Water in the World, CARBON VISUALS (Sept.

24, 2014), https://perma.cc/H7JL-FMWY.
12

Current World Populations, WORLDOMETERS, https://perma.cc/J7BX-2FE3 (last

visited Apr. 4, 2017)
13

PATRICIA PARK, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ENERGY & THE ENVIRONMENT 299 (2nd ed.,

2013); see also MANOHAR PAWAR, WATER & SOCIAL POLICY 42 (2014).
14

V. I. Grover, Water: Global Common Global Problems, 380 SCIENCE PUB, (2006).

15

See PARK, supra note 13, at 299–300; see also PAWAR, supra note 13, at 42–43.
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even at the start of the twenty-first century.16
More than 100 largest rivers of the world are stretched across the boundaries of more than
two nations, and they share their basins with neighboring countries.17 The Mekong, Niger,
Congo-Zambezi, Nile, Amazon, Brahmaputra, and Indus rivers are the largest international
rivers.18 As a result, large and powerful states such as China and India have begun efforts
to gain freshwater reservoirs by building huge storage facilities to control water reserves
and thereby regional economics and geopolitics.19
China has built more than 80,000 dams, with 4,000 medium-sized storage and navigational
projects, of which more than a hundred are huge.20 By comparison, India has constructed
more than 5,000 large storage and navigational projects on river waters, of which 50 are
immensely large dams.21 Projects over shared waters have generally been constructed

16

PARK, supra note 13, at 299; see also, PAWAR, supra note 13, at 42.

17

Anthony Turton, The Southern African Hydropolitical Complex, in MANAGEMENT OF

TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS & LAKES 21, 64 (Olli Varis et al. eds., 2008).
18

Kazuaki Hori & Yoshiki Saito, Classification, Architecture, and Evolution of Large-

River Deltas, in LARGE RIVERS: GEOMORPHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 75, 76-78 (Avijit
Gupta ed., 2007).
19

BÉRÉNICE GUYOT-RÉCHARD, SHADOW STATES: INDIA, CHINA & HIMALAYAS, 1910-

1962, at 270 (2017).
20

China, INT’L RIVERS, https://perma.cc/5D2G-9MKA (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).

21

Ananda Banerjee, How Many Dams Does India Need?, LIVEMINT (May 25, 2015)

https://perma.cc/RDt7-D66F.
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without the approval or consent of the lower riparian states.22 These, in turn, negatively
affect the lower riparian states’ environment and economies, and disturb human settlements
in both upper and lower riparian nations.23 These practices also restrict freshwater fish
migration and prevent clean water use for agricultural and domestic purposes in the lower
riparian nations. Consequently, India, as a lower riparian state to China, fears Chinese
construction works over the Brahmaputra River, as there is no bilateral treaty among these
states to safeguard each other’s water interests.24 Similarly, Pakistan as a lower riparian
state to India, continually protests the illicit construction works on the western rivers that
were allocated to Pakistan by the IWT, a bilateral water sharing treaty between India and
Pakistan.25
Similarly, in Africa, Ethiopia is constructing the largest regional dam on the waters of the
Nile River. As a result, lower riparian states such as Egypt and Sudan are contesting its

22

NAROTTAM P. BANSKOTA, SOUTH ASIA TRADE & ENERGY SECURITY: THE ROLE OF

INDIA 81 (2012).
23

Jayante Bandyopadhyay, Restoration of Ecological Status of Himalayam Rivers in

China and India: The Case of the Two Mother Rivers – The Yellow and the Ganges, in
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY FROM THE HIMALAYAS TO THE OCEAN 69, 70–80
(Shikui Dong et al. eds., 2017).
24

Uttam Kumar Sinha, Towards Riparian Rationality: an Indian Perspective, in CHINA–

INDIA RELATIONS: COOPERATION & CONFLICT 167, 168 (Kanti Bajpai et al. eds., 2016).
25

ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 2, at 54–55
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legality.26 Likewise, already devastated by war, the state of Syria is further threatened by
construction work on the Euphrates by the Turkish regime for storage purposes, which also
serves the political ends of their ongoing armed conflict.27
Of all river basins of the world, 263 rivers share their basins across borders; the population
residing in countries with international rivers encompass 40 percent of the world
population.28 Some rivers, including the Nile, Niger, Rhine, Zambezi, and others, have
more than eight co-riparian states, sharing river basins with several nations
simultaneously.29 Even more shockingly, international rivers—containing 60 percent of
global river water—do not have any sort of agreement or treaty between the co-riparian
states.30 So there is a legal vacuum regarding the use and sharing of freshwater
internationally.

26

JOHN MARKAKIS, ETHIOPIA: THE LAST TWO FRONTIERS 339–344 (2011).

27

ROY L. NERSESIAN, ENERGY ECONOMICS: MARKETS, HISTORY, AND POLICY 421

(2016); see also Jane V. Hall & Darwin C. Hall, Environmental Resource Scarcity and
Conflict, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR & PEACE 177, 188 (Murray Wolfson ed.,,
1998).
28

JACQUELINE VAUGHN, CONFLICTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: A REFERENCE

HANDBOOK 94 (2007).
29

Fred Pearce, A Global Treaty on Rivers, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Nov. 19, 2012),

[https://perma.cc/8MSN-E2UK].
30

Id.
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Accordingly, this paper is divided into seven sections. Section 1 will explore the regional
legal framework regarding the water apportionment of international watercourses. Here,
treaty laws and experts’ opinions will be assessed.
Section 2 will start with a global view of the international law of water sharing. Within this
section, Section 2.1 will briefly touch upon customary international law and Section 2.2
will elaborate the developments in international water sharing law.
Subsequently, Section 3 will give a brief overview of international instruments. Section 3.1
will explain the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (UNWC) and briefly go into why it was formed. Section 3.2
will give a similarly brief analysis of the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers (DALTA).
Section 4 will expand upon the key principles and obligations that have been established
through UNWC and DALTA. Section 4.1 will explain the “principle of equitable and
reasonable water utilization” and 4.2 will define the “obligation of not to cause harm.”
Section 5 will elaborate on the procedural duties laid down in UNWC and DALTA. Here,
various aspects of water apportionment and utilization will be explored, such as the duty
of a state to cooperate with other concerned states, the duty to notify other concerned states
about planned activities, and the duty not to pollute and harm the environment.
Section 6 will provide a brief analysis of the provisions of DALTA, as a reflection of the
same notions of principles, obligations, and duties of the UNWC.
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Finally, Section 7 will explore the equivalence between the IWT and the UNWC, with
regard to the principles, obligations, and duties that are universally acclaimed and, more
importantly, established by the UNWC.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL LAW OF WATER
This section will elaborate the regional legal framework pertaining to water apportionment.
This overview will demonstrate the scarcity of water, while discussing the treaty laws of
various regions, while weighing expert opinions within the same equation.
Scholars and futurists alike have suggested that water will be the most important
commodity in the future.31 In only the last five decades, the use of water has tripled across
the globe, mainly for agrarian purposes, owing to the surge in population.32 Consequently,
environmental devastation is put down to navigational and storage usages of water.
Therefore, water scarcity in the future is considered imminent and experts believe that
water conflicts and inadvertent water wars are inevitable.33
Nonetheless, with a reasonable and sophisticated approach, these conflicts can be managed

31

Paolo Turrini, Virtual Water: A Global Economic Solution to a Local Environmental

and Political Problem, in CHARTING THE WATER REGULATORY FUTURE: ISSUES,
CHALLENGES, AND DIRECTIONS 55, 55-56 (Julien Chaisse ed., 2017).
32

Michael Gordy, DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: RUMINATIONS

ON A WAY FORWARD
33

3 (2016).

See Turrini, supra note 31, at 55–56.
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peacefully, through co-riparian states entering into water sharing treaties.34 In the last halfcentury, more than 150 water sharing treaties have been formed, which have restrained the
number of water conflicts to fewer than forty.35 This is mainly because nations across the
globe prefer predictable outcomes, and choose peace over war.
It is interesting to note that the first treaty formed to end armed conflict was promulgated
in 2500 B.C. over the sharing of the waters of the Tigris River, between Lagash and
Umma.36 Since then, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations has
reported that over 3,500 water sharing treaties have been agreed over international rivers
since A.D. 805.37 Hitherto, such treaties have largely focused on the navigational purpose
of waters, whereas modern treaties look upon the non-navigational uses of waters, such as
water usage for consumptive, protective, and storage purposes.38
Legal mechanisms of water sharing treaties and agreements have survived conflicts and

34

DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE FIVE HORSEMEN OF THE MODERN WORLD: CLIMATE, FOOD,

WATER, DISEASE, AND OBESITY 251 (2016).
35

Id.

36

David P. Forsythe, Water and Politics in the Tigris – Euphrates Basin: Hope for

Negative Learning, in WATER SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 167, 172 (Jean A. Cahan
ed., 2017).
37

VELMA I. GROVER, WATER: A SOURCE OF CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 29 (2007).

38

Alexandre Kiss, Public Lectures on International Environmental Law, in THE LAW OF

ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6, 12 (Adrian J. Bradbrook et al. eds., 2005).
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wars across the globe.39 For instance, regulations and negotiations over the waters of the
Mekong River through the Mekong River Commission survived the Vietnam War among
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.40 Similarly, water sharing negotiations over the
Jordan River have endured armed conflicts and warfare between Jordan and Israel.
Analogously, the Indus Waters Treaty over six major rivers feeding billions of people has
subsisted despite ongoing hostilities and two major wars between the hostile neighboring
states of Pakistan and India.41
Furthermore, the legal framework over the waters of the Nile River was agreed upon in
1999 by ten co-riparian states, to justifiably use shared water resources in the hope of
developing regional peace and economic security.42 Consistently, for the same reasons, the
co-riparian states of the Niger River agreed to a similar legal framework to establish an

39

Meredith A. Giordano & Aaron T. Wolf, The World’s International Freshwater

Agreements: Historical Developments and Future Opportunities, in ATLAS OF
INTERNATIONAL FRESHWATER AGREEMENTS 1, 3-5 (2002).
40

Michael Richardson, China and the Potential for Conflict Over Water Among Eurasian

States, in WATER ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: PRESENT TRENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
27, 30 (Lee Poh Onn ed., 2013).
41

Giordano, supra note 39, at 3-5.

42

Assefa M. Melesse et al., Hydrological Variability and Climate of the Upper Blue Nile

River Basin, in NILE RIVER BASIN: HYDROLOGY, CLIMATE AND WATER USAGE 3, 14
(Aseffa M/ Melesse ed., 2011).
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impartial mechanism over the use of fresh waters.43 These mutually agreed legal
frameworks across the globe reflect the global need for an equitable and impartial higher
authority or legal framework over the use of freshwater resources. An international
organization to envisage the neutrality and justice of water sharing through an impersonal
instrument would be ideal. Comparably, in the parallel legal world of armed conflict the
UN Charter is an international instrument to regulate the use of force.44
That there have been over 3,500 water sharing treaties is in itself a great achievement of
civilization over the course of history to avoid greater conflicts.45 But putting these
instruments under scrutiny will demonstrate the imperfections and frailties within them.
These characteristics include the inadequacy of monitoring regimes, the ineffectiveness of
enforcements against treaty violations, and the lack of adequate mechanisms to forestall
the changing facets of politics, economies, technologies, and other needs.46
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FRESHWATER
To fill the gap in the legal frameworks over the world, in 1997 the United Nations devised
the United Nations Convention on Non-Navigational Watercourses (also known as the UN

43

INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 91

(OCED ed., 2013).
44

U.N. Charter.

45

JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING & TRANSFORMING WATER

CONFLICTS 62 (2009).
46

Id.
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Watercourses Convention and referred to here as the UNWC) for the sole purpose of
equitably sharing fresh waters among co-riparian states.47 Within this legal framework, the
UN envisioned two basic legal principles over water sharing among co-riparian states.
These include the principle of the “equitable and reasonable utilization of watercourses”
and the principle of “the obligation not to cause significant harm” to neighboring and coriparian states.48 Largely, this framework is a guidance instrument for states, whereas
nations establish their water sharing mechanisms themselves.49
However, it is unanimously agreed among academics that further work on this instrument
is required to develop an enforcement mechanism and to administer punitive approaches
against violators of treaties and bilateral agreements.50 Conversely, broader perspectives—
of societal and normative changing aspects—and resonating water attribution
characteristics—including but not limited to changing dynamics of river basins—are

47

Daniel Malzbender & Anton Earle, Southern Africa, in THE UN WATERCOURSES

CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER MANAGEMENT 112, 117 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds.,
2013).
48

Id.

49

Patricia Wouters, Addressing Water Security Challenges: The International Law ‘Duty

to Cooperate’ as a Limit on Absolute State Sovereignty, A HISTORY OF WATER:
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW 334, 338 (Terje Tvedt et al. eds., 2015).
50

MAGSIG, supra note 4, at 27.

101

incorporated within the framework.51 This section will elaborate on international water
sharing law. Here, Section 2.1 will briefly touch upon what constitutes customary
international law. Later, Section 2.2 will elaborate on the developments of international
law in regard to water apportionment and utilization among co-riparian states.

A. Customary International Law

The main determination of the UNWC and DALTA was to establish fundamental
principles for laws regarding international waters. However, the legal framework of the
international law of water sharing is not limited to these conventions; customary
international law is derived from bilateral and multilateral agreements or treaties, and
further derived from case law, such as opinio juris, and practices of the states, comprising
jus cogen principles established by such practices.52 The practices and case law serving as
customary international law can also be derived from judgments of international courts or
international arbitrations, in furtherance of certain conventions relating to the international

51

Patricia Wouters & Ruby Moynihan, Water Security – Legal Frameworks and the UN

Watercourses Convention, in THE U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE:
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 336,
346 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013).
52

THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW & SOCIAL CONTRACT136

(2015).
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law of international waters more generally.53 Similarly, the opinions of renowned
academics are useful to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in ascertaining customary
international law.54
When there is no neutral authority serving to regulate the legal frameworks of international
law, or to represent the juridical positions of aggrieved weak states, the machinery of
customary international law (CIL) seems a primitive legal system. This, coupled with a
lack of an enforcement mechanism, appears inadequate.55 Nevertheless, CIL is not a wholly
ineffective system for providing rules, as it still holds merit. Yet, owing to its shortfall to
provide adequate punitive measures or enforcement mechanisms, the only available
remedy under CIL is to take unilateral forceful retaliation.56 That will only ensure justice
for the powerful and atrocities against the poor and weak, because the rich will always be
able to muscle their way to meet their interests. For these reasons, CIL is considered a
catastrophic way of resolving water sharing conflicts in international waters among co-

53

Id.

54

CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 14 (2005).

55

See generally LEONARD M. HAMMER, A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL

LAW: DESCRIPTIVE THOUGHTS FOR NORMATIVE ISSUES (2016).
56 Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Nile as a Legal and Political Structure, in THE SCARCITY
OF WATER: EMERGING LEGAL & POLITICAL RESPONSES

al. eds., 1997).
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121, 123 (Edward H.P. Brans et

riparian states.57
B. Developments in Water Sharing International Law
It was soon after World War I that international organizations started to prioritize
multilateral water sharing treaties with non-navigational usage.58 However, countries
around the globe did not show much enthusiasm in joining hands and forming such a
mechanism. As a result, the Convention of Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting
More than One State of 1923 is unique of that era. This instrument acknowledged the water
rights of co-riparian states, and obliged signatory states to assess the interests of co-riparian
states when devising water usage components.59
By the middle of the twentieth century, owing to a surge in population and amplified
agrarian and industrial economies, a water usage mechanism with regard to nonnavigational usage became more prominent. These mounting apprehensions about water
shortcomings and lack of a mechanism to regulate water use shaped the 1966 Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, better known as the Helsinki Rules,60 formed

57

See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE U.S & THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 29 (,

2004).
58

Robert Mrljić, Challenges of Environmental Protection in Times of Armed Conflict, in

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 119, 134 ( Massimiliano Montini
& Slavko Bogdanovic eds., 2011).
59

Id.

60

SLAVKO BOGDANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES, at xv (2001).

104

by a team of experts serving the International Law Association (ILA).61 The Helsinki Rules
covered navigational and non-navigational uses of water resources; they were developed
by judiciously and empirically evaluating state practices in regard to water apportionment.
This was ultimately meant to establish international laws to regulate the reasonable sharing
and management of water resources among co-riparian states for international rivers.62
Later, in 1970, a Finnish delegation proposed to the United Nations that the “progressive
development and codification of the rules of international law relating to international
watercourses” must be included in agendas of the General Assembly (GA).63 This Finnish
proposal was approved by member states and the GA embraced Resolution 2669;
subsequently, the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC, a body of the GA)
was tasked with conducting a study to form a legal framework for international rivers for
the co-riparian states.64 Consequently, after almost 30 years of research and formulation,
in 1997 ILC drafted the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (UNWC). This convention is a multilateral treaty that
specifically covers non-navigational uses and the management of international waters,

61

Id.

62

ANTOINETTE HILDERING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND

WATER MANAGEMENT 47 (2004).
63

LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26

(2013).
64

Patricia Wouters, Editor’s Foreword, in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED

WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE at
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xiii, xxi (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997).

establishing a set of universally accepted progressive principles regarding the nonnavigational uses of waters.65
In 2004, the ILA further proposed the Berlin Rules of Water Resources to succeed its
previous Helsinki Rules.66 These new rules were needed because the old framework did
not cater groundwater resources and environmental aspects in its principles for water
sharing.67 The Berlin Rules were meant to cover all aspects of freshwater resources, while
specifically considering the environmental aspects connected with water management.68
On the progressive discourse, in 2008 the ILC adopted a new instrument, the Draft Articles
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (DALTA) to cater to evolving water management
needs, this time to specifically accommodate groundwater. This new mechanism was only

65

NAHID ISLAM, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL

WATERCOURSES 115 (2010).
66

ROBERT MALIVA & THOMAS MISSIMER, ARID LANDS WATER EVALUATION AND

MANAGEMENT 958 ( Rod Allan et al. eds., 2012).
67

Id.

68

See ONITA DAS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICT: FILING THE GAPS

WITH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,

in WAR AND THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW APPROACHES TO

PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN RELATION TO ARMED CONFLICT 129, 153 ( Rosemay
Rayfuse ed., 2014).
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promulgated within the period of five years of research, mainly because the narrative
principles within this instrument reflected the core values of the UNWC.69
The UNWC came into force in the year 2014, with only the bare minimum 35 ratifications
required.70 By contrast, DALTA wasintended to become a reference manuscript regarding
the management of groundwater resources, and was not meant to become treaty law.71
Together, both legal frameworks provide an international legal mechanism to manage river
waters and groundwaters among co-riparian states and aquifer states, and are intended to
be respected by the whole world.72 Concernedly, both instruments stand on universally
accepted legal principles, such as the principle of the equitable apportionment of freshwater

69

Joseph W. Dellapenna & Flavia Rocha Loures, Filling Gaps: A Protocol to Govern

Groundwater Resources Relevance to International Law, in THE U.N. WATERCOURSES
CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER MANAGEMENT 270, 274 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds.,
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and the principle to oblige by the rule not to harm co-riparian states.73 In total, these
instruments represent principles in the form of obligations to cooperate with co-riparian
states in order to curtail conflicts and endorse peaceful mechanisms for sharing waters.74
Both instruments further state that co-riparian states must cooperate with each other in
forming commissions and exchanging water information on a regular basis, and must notify
each other about their mechanical works beforehand and seek the consent of co-riparian
states to avoid conflicts and wars.75 The UNWC obliges member states to share information
relating to water quality, conditions, and mechanisms, and further mandates that data of a
“hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological or ecological nature” must be exchanged
with the co-riparian states.76 The UNWC provides mechanisms to regulate such exchange
of information and notifications.77
Similarly, DALTA establishes an obligation on neighboring states sharing groundwater,
that one state must not pollute groundwater, which can potentially harm the interests of
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neighboring aquifer countries.78 Since scientifically there is little known regarding
groundwater implications, caution must be exercised when using such water resources.
Moreover, DALTA obliges aquifer countries to protect discharge and recharge regions for
groundwater.79 This is because the administration of these regions is largely responsible
for the fluctuating quality of groundwater.80 In other words, the engagements in such
regions influence the quality of aquifers in neighboring regions. Similarly, industrial and
agrarian activities can also impact the quality of aquifers. Therefore, DALTA also provides
regulations regarding these activities.81
As a result, the relevant legal authority for international water conflicts remains the
conventions of the UN. These conventions represent true international law regarding the
utilization of international waters.82

78

Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 1, 2, &

12, 2008.
79

Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 1, 2, 6,

10, & 11, 2008..
80

Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers Preamble &

art. 17 & 19, 2008.
81

82

Id.
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law and the Provision of Water for Megacities, in ECOLOGICAL

SYSTEMS INTEGRITY: GOVERNANCE, LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 76, 79 (Laura Westa et al.
eds., 2015).

109

IV. CODIFICATIONS
The most notable codifications pertaining the international law of water include the
International Law Association’s Helsinki Rules of 1966, their successor, the Berlin Rules
of 2004, the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses of 1997, UNECE’s UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes of 1992, and the Draft Articles on
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers of 2008, although through conventions and treaties
there have been several other notable efforts to form a legal framework to equitably and
peacefully share freshwater among co-riparian states.
However, only the most appropriate and most acclaimed international instruments will be
discussed in this section. Section 3.1 will only cover the UNWC and Section 3.2 will only
look at DALTA.
A. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
(UNWC)
Sometimes also referred to as the UN Watercourses Convention, UNWC remains an
authority for the principles and regulations in the law of international waters.83 This
instrument was drafted in 1997 but came into force in 2014, when it was ratified by the
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necessary 35 participants. This framework not only mandates cooperation among coriparian states but also devises water management guidelines.84
This convention has only received 36 ratifications over the course of 17 years.85 Many
powerful countries have refrained from ratifying this instrument to avoid legal implications
regarding harming or injuring lower riparian states. For instance, Turkey, India, and the
USA have refrained from being parties to this treaty. Almost all European countries have
ratified it, though the treaty was meant to form regulations for all UN member states.86
Regardless of the reservations by several countries, UNWC is in force and is applicable to
all UN member states.87 This instrument obliges member states to refrain from harming
co-riparian states, and mandates that water sharing must be equitable.88 The principles and
obligations established by the UNWC will be set out in detail in the next section. These
include the principle of equitably sharing water resources with co-riparian states, the
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obligation not to harm co-riparian states by way of managing international shared waters,
and the obligation to notify concerned riparian states about future works on water
resources.89
B. Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifiers (DALTA)
GA Resolutions A/RES/63/124 and 66/104 adopted the Draft Articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers of 2008 in 2011; these articles and resolutions constitute
international guidance for sharing groundwater resources among aquifer states.90 These
instruments call upon states to “to make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for
the proper management of their transboundary aquifers, taking into account the provisions
of these draft articles.”91 These provisions urge nations to counteract and control the water
pollution of groundwater. Co-aquifer states are invited through this instrument to follow
these guidelines in forming their respective treaty laws.92 Until this instrument was
adopted, there was no clear body that provided concrete guidelines regarding the utilization
and preservation of groundwater among co-aquifer states, so it is in itself an achievement,
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reaching a unanimous and peaceful management tool for the sharing and protection of
groundwater.93
V. PRINCIPLES AND OBLIGATIONS
This section will provide thorough analyses of the underlying principles established by the
UNWC and DALTA. Section 4.1 will explain what the principle of the equitable and
reasonable utilization of international watercourses entails. Section 4.2 will elucidate the
obligation of not to cause harm to other co-riparian states.
A. Principle of the Equitable and Reasonable Utilization of an International Watercourse
Since the most distinguished and appreciated principle for water sharing among co-riparian
states is the principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization,” it is largely accepted by the
global community.94 It was the UNWC that established this universally agreed principle
for sharing waters among co-riparian states. This principle requires the equitable water
apportionment by all nations alike. Article 5 of the UNWC reads as follows.
Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In
particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by
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watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests
of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection
of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. Such in participation includes both the right to utilize the
watercourse and the duty to co-operate in the protection and development
thereof, as provided in the present Convention.95
All states that have river basins of international waters within their territories are rightfully
entitled to use waters from these rivers within their territories.96 However, Article 5
mandates that such utilization must be practiced in a fashion that is both equitable and
reasonable.97 The idea is to utilize the shared international water basin by acquiring the
benefits of all water resources in a protectable, sustainable, and reasonable way, while
keeping the interests of co-riparian states in mind. Article 5 further states that future plans
for devising the mechanism for water developments on such international watercourses
must also be reasonable and equitable, in such a manner that they sustainably utilize the
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benefits of these waters and yet cooperate with co-riparian states to protect their interests.98
This principle of equitable and reasonable water apportionment has been universally
acclaimed,99 and state practices around the globe demonstrate an endorsement of this
principle, which is largely due to the juridical and rational managerial element of this water
sharing principle. Various international courts of justice and forums of arbitration have
used this principle in their adjudications.100
The staple node of this principle maintains that all countries are sovereign nations and no
state is superior to another: that all countries are equal in the equation of balance of
justice.101 For this reason, the principle entails that every country that shares the basin of
any international water river basin has a right to use those waters as a collective resource.102
Within this discourse, upper and lower riparian states are equal, and the right of the upper
riparian state is no more than that of the lower riparian state sharing same international
river water basins. Nevertheless, the principle also advocates that the implementation of
this right must not interfere with the interests of other co-riparian states.103
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Further, this principle also entails two more basic notions of managing international shared
waters. The first suggests that the equitable utilization does not necessitate two precisely
equal apportionments for two riparian states that share international river waters basins.
This is because the principle gives due regard to the shared water basin along with other
contingent aspects in its equation, and maintains that water apportionment must be
reasonable.104 So, if two countries share a river basin then the countries will not get an
equal amount of the waters; other aspects of requirements and utilization of waters will be
weighed in the equation to calculate each nation’s fair share. The second idea of this
principle is that equitable and reasonable apportionment does not mean that the state with
cutting-edge technologies, possessing the means to more effectively use river waters, will
be allowed a larger water share.105 For instance, if the upper riparian state is a financially
strong nation, it cannot exploit the water share of the lower riparian state by building more
water management machinery at the courses of international waters.
This principle of sharing water is not wholly inflexible pertaining to water apportionment,
but rather it responds to emerging and evolving environs of utilizing water apportionment
by weighing in all facets of the interests of co-riparian states.106 The reasonable water
apportionment among co-riparian states is only feasible through this element of the
principle. But this aspect necessitates that all characteristics and factors of a given situation
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must be evaluated when mechanizing any utilization of international waters by co-riparian
states.107 These factors and aspects include geological, social, economic, and
environmental factors, and also contain the factors of alternative procedures, sustainability,
and the protection of waters.108 Furthermore, these aspects can be further managed by
keeping fluctuating natural or manmade unforeseeable factors in mind. Consequently, the
water apportionment principles mandate that the management of water use must be
regularly and continuously reviewed, owing to its evolving multifaceted characteristics.109
B. Obligation Not to Cause Harm
The second respected and acclaimed principle under international water sharing law is the
obligation not to harm other co-riparian states, which is better known as the “no harm rule.”
The UNWC contains this obligation in its Article 7, which reads as follows.
Article 7: Obligation not to cause harm
1. Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other watercourse states.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse state,
the states whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement
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to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the
provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected state, to
eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the
question of compensation.110
This Article prohibits co-riparian states from harming or injuring the interests of each other
while utilizing international freshwater. This harm can be defined as polluting water flows,
decreasing water quantities unreasonably, de-silting waters, harming the environment, and
navigating watercourses.111
This obligation of not to harm other states is based on the three integrated notions of sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your own as not to harm that of another), good
neighborliness, and/or of abuse of rights.112 All three of these notions pertain to the
conflicts among states. The primary nexus here is that the actions of one state within its
territories must not harm or injure the interests of any other state.
However, it is appropriate to note that this obligation not to harm other states—which is
similar to the principle of equitably and reasonably utilizing waters—is not inflexible. But
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it adapts in terms of the harm created for the other state, by evaluating contingent aspects
of the situation.113
One aspect of this principle is reflected within the language of the Article itself, where it is
explicitly drafted that the harm inflicted must be significant in its effect.114 This contention
is also asserted by state practices and case law, where it is repeatedly maintained that harm
must be substantial and not be trivial to give rise to reciprocal or punitive measures.115
Nevertheless, the line that differentiates a trivial harm from substantial harm is vague, and
therefore contingent upon aspects of the individual case in any given situation.
Another aspect of this principle is that it conditions the widely practiced notion of due
diligence, by which co-riparian states are not only required to own the injuries they have
caused during the course of their actions as damages after they have been administered;
they are also required in advance to take all measures necessary to avoid such injurious or
harmful effects.116 This aspect of due diligence further suggests that such measures must
also take all contingent factors of a given situation into account. Finally, due diligence
entails that these measures should be undertaken at the national level, where appropriate

113

ARIEL DINARET AL.,, BRIDGES OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING TRANSBOUNDARY

WATER CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION 184 (2013).
114

Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,

art. 7, May 21, 1997, 51 U.N.T.S. 49.
115

NAHID ISLAM, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL

WATERCOURSES 147 (2010).
116

2 ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949–1998 1365 (2000).

119

statutory proceedings should anticipate the effects of management and implementation.117
Moreover, this principle does not particularly take the side of the lower riparian states, to
which the same obligation not to harm co-riparian states applies equally. The infliction of
harm by a lower riparian state to an upper riparian state may seem improbable but it is
not.118 For instance, heavy and unreasonable water usage of the lower riparian state could
potentially harm the upper riparian state, by requiring that upper riparian decrease its water
usage, as the river water is insufficient for the lower riparian state. So, in this sense, the
reasonable utilization of waters and the no harm rule are also applicable to lower riparian
states.119 Nonetheless, the no harm rule cannot absolutely restrict the upper riparian state
from installing development works over the international watercourses.
No harm obligation categorically proscribes “appreciable harm, [or sensible harm,] or
significant harm, and substantial injury” over a co-riparian state, be it an upper riparian or
a lower riparian state.120 Thus, the implication here is that the overall water usage is
reasonable and equitable or not. The case law of a German court in this regard concluded
that “[o]ne must consider not only the absolute injury caused to the neighboring State, but
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also the relation of the advantage gained by one to the injury caused to the other.”121 This
ruling integrates the principle of equitable and reasonable water utilization with the
obligation not to harm by suggesting that a co-riparian state must not only not harm the
other riparian states in the international watercourses, but also weigh the equitableness and
reasonableness of their activities, which then will be rationally and judiciously applicable
on upper riparian states and as well as on the lower riparian states.122
VI. PROCEDURAL DUTIES
Procedural obligations are essentially and significantly necessary in the international law
of water sharing for two main reasons. One reason is that the procedural rules lay the
foundations for the legal mechanism to uphold the legal machinery of other obligations and
principles. The other objective is that these procedural obligations can avoid major
conflicts by anticipating the rules of the game beforehand.123
These obligations include “the obligation of prior notification, the obligation to exchange
data and information, the obligation to consult with potentially affected states, the
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obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the central and
embracing obligation to cooperate.”124
This section will briefly set out these obligations one by one, in view of draft writings
within international instruments and their interpretations in light of customary international
law.
A. The Obligation to Notify Planned Activities to Concerned or Affected States
Article 12 of the UNWC establishes the principle of the obligation to notify concerned
riparian states about the planned measures of a state. Article 12 states as follows.
Article 12: Notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse
effects
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of planned
measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse
States, it shall provide those States with timely notification thereof. Such
notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and information,
including the results of any environmental impact assessment, in order to enable
the notified States to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures.125
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This Article obliges all states to notify other concerned co-riparian states about the planned
activities of managerial concerns over the waters and about their potential adverse effects
against the concerned states.126 The most potent and comprehensible approach behind such
obligations suggests that such an obligation will help affected states prepare for and
anticipate the consequences of legal, economical, geological, financial, and other
contingent aspects.127
For this reason, in addition to notification, it is further necessitated by this Article that such
communication by a state must accompany certain crucial information reports. These
include technical data and concerned knowledge, along with environmental impact
assessments (EIA)128 so that a concerned state can timely anticipate the adverse effects of
the planned activities.129 However, it is relevant to note that this obligation to notify is not
applicable solely to the upper riparian states; lower riparian states are also obliged to
prepare reports and brief upper riparian states regarding the possible adverse effects of their
planned activities against the concerns and interests of the upper riparian states.130
Furthermore, the obligation to notify concerned states does not imply that such information
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need be communicated only once, but such notification should be communicated timely
and regularly to encompass the changing dynamics of the situation with even better
analysis of technical data.131 This requirement is crucial in the overall equation of equitably
and reasonably utilizing international watercourses, because this communication and the
conveyance of data lay the foundations of evaluations to form a sound analysis of regional,
social, economic, financial, geological, and other aspects of a situation by both riparian
states. In the result, without this notification and exchange of data, effects over
international waters are incalculable.132
Articles 13 to 18 of the UNWC are also concerned with the notification process. These
articles also oblige the notified state to reply to any notification as soon as possible.133 The
UNWC further provides notification and the reply periods and also delivers procedural
measures that are to be respected in the absence of any reply. Additionally, Article 14
requires that the notifying state give further information required by notified state in order
to better evaluate the circumstances.134
B. The Requirement to Enter into Consultations for Managerial Purposes
Article 24 of the UNWC establishes a procedural duty to enter into consultation. Article
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24 states as follows.
Article 24: Management
1. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into
consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management
mechanism
2. For the purpose of this article, “management” refers, in particular to:
a. planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse
and providing for the implementation of any plans adopted, and
b. otherwise promoting rational and optimal utilization, protection and
control of the watercourse.135
This Article is a procedural obligation that obliges co-riparian states to enter into
consultation with each other for the managerial work of planned activities, so that
conflicting interests can be peacefully and diplomatically resolved.136
Consultation is not to be confused with the idea of acquiring consent of affected state. The
notion of consent is set out in Article 14 of the UNWC, which states that, after notification,
the notifying state cannot implement its planned activities without the due consent of the
notified state. Article 14(b), regarding the actions of notifying states, reads that the
notifying state “[s]hall not implement or permit the implementation of the planned
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measures without the consent of the notified States.”137
However, the scope of consultation is restricted by Article 24, and this capacity is strictly
limited to the extent of managerial purposes, which is a first step forward to enter into the
negotiating process of bilateral dialogues among co-riparian states. Through consultation,
concerned states can share their interests and views regarding the planned activities in a
more peaceful and acceptable manner.138
C. The Duty to Prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
In addition to the implication of preparing an EIA by Article 12 of the UNWC, the duty to
prepare an EIA has been generally acclaimed by international community.139 In fact, this
obligation of preparing environmental feasibility report has evolved to become applicable
international law, when in 2010 the ICJ established this duty in the case of Argentina v.
Uruguay, better known as the Pulp Mills Case.140 The judgment of this case established
that it is necessary to prepare an EIA in a situation “where there is a risk that the proposed
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in
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particular, on a shared resource.”141
Here the underlying concept is that, before executing any planned activities, an EIA must
be prepared to understand the environmental implications affecting the notifying country
and other states that could potentially be adversely affected.142 This is to be prepared
beforehand, to better understand the implications and thus avoid hazards and adverse
effects and prevent or mitigate injury to the environment.143
Sadly, owing to unenforceable impediments in international law, EIAs remain largely
unexplored. So national legislation is persistently silent on its specifics. However, it is
established that an EIA report must be prepared beforehand to assess the environmental
implications of planned projects.144
D. Duty to Cooperate with Co-Riparian States
UNWC imposes a general obligation over co-riparian states to cooperate with each other
to pacify regional water conflicts. The relevant Article of the UNWC states as follows.
Article 8: General Obligation to Cooperate
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1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to obtain optimal utilization
and adequate protection of an international watercourse
2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed
necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and
procedures in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing
joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions.145
This obligation to cooperate encompasses all other principles and obligations, since the
term “cooperation” can be described as “the voluntary coordinated action of two or more
States which takes place under a legal regime and serves a specific objective . . . [t]o this
extent it marks the effort of States to accomplish an object by joint action, where the
activity of a single State cannot achieve the same result.”146
Within the scope of this definition, all states are obliged to voluntarily share their views,
concerns, and interests with other concerned states, so that the utilization of international
water can be managed more effectively, equitably, and reasonably. However, it is
appropriate to note that such cooperation is reciprocal in nature between the upper and
lower riparian states, and entails continuous cooperation.147
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Moreover, this cooperation cannot be enforced by mere implications in customary
international law and by providing guidelines. Enforcement of this obligation is only
possible by forming bilateral or multilateral water sharing treaties, where states
unanimously agree to regulations entailing and upholding the said notions of cooperation
through new articles in treaties. For this reason, Article 8(2) maintains that, to enforce
cooperation among states, commissions may be formed along with joint mechanisms to
function effectively.148
E. Duty to Protect the Environment
Customarily, international instruments, such as multilateral or bilateral treaties, are more
concerned with the navigational uses of water and its apportionment, while ignoring the
environmental impact of such watercourse diversions and their subsequent devastating
impact on the ecosystem.149 However, in the recent times, the point of contention has
moved more toward the nonnavigational uses of water and the safety of the environment
during planned activities, such as the impacts of polluting international watercourses. For
this reason, a new dawn of environmentally friendly system is emerging, where the
ecosystem, environmental degradation, and the impact on the lives of flora and fauna are
the main focus.150
Therefore, treaties are now more oriented toward environmentally friendly agreements,
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ensuring ecological harmony with water managerial projects by proscribing hazardous or
calamitous activities toward the environment.151
These environmental aspects include controlling pollution and water contamination,
maintaining water quality, preserving flora and fauna in perpetual balance with nature, not
disturbing ecosystems, and prohibiting deforestation.152 These emerging norms are readily
reflected in modern treaties, UN conventions, and state practices, by which states are
obliged to prevent injury against the environment by minimizing projects’ impacts on
nature, and thus looking toward a sustainable future for the world.153
In this regard, Article 12 of the UNWC requires states to prepare EIAs, and Article 21
obliges states to prevent, reduce, and control water pollution.154 Similarly, Article 23 of the
UNWC calls for the preservation of the marine environment.155
F. Duty to Consider Water as a Vital Human Need
While keeping in mind that water is vital for the survival of every nation, and in fact for
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any living being, the UNWC’s Article 10 states as follows.
Article 10: Relationship between uses
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an
international watercourse enjoys priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international water course, it
shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors set out in
articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the requirements of vital
human needs156
The idea is that, since water is a building block for life, and water is vital for human
survival, co-riparian states—while forming or establishing water sharing treaties—must
consider water as an essential aspect of life, such that every person and hence each state
has an innate requirement for water.157 This notion is more particularly applicable to waterstressed countries, where large numbers of people have no access to drinkable water.
Therefore, the wording of Article 10 of UNWC explicitly mentions water as a vital
necessity for humankind, and urges states to give this aspect of water special regard while
resolving any given water conflict, or while proposing water sharing treaties.158
This requirement in UNWC is intended to encompass human sustainability, therefore both
purposes of water usage—drinking purposes and agrarian purposes for the production of
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food—come within the scope of this Article.159 Similarly, DALTA supplements the
UNWC’s claims by stating that conflicting states must prioritize water and its vitality in
sustainability while reasonably and equitably utilizing water.160
Owing to the empowering nature of the notion of water’s vitality for humankind in DALTA
and UNWC, international law and more specifically humanitarian international laws are
acknowledging water as a basic human right. Here the main contention is that, while
forming water apportionment treaties and regulations, water as a vital aspect of life must
be given first priority.161 For instance, if the question in conflict is regarding power
production, the assessment of water requirements for the basic needs of drinking and
growing food will always be given priority over nonconsumptive purposes, such as water
use for hydropower production.
VII. GROUNDWATER
This section will briefly touch upon the same principles, obligations, and duties of water
utilization established by UNWC. However, this section will deal particularly with the
scope of DALTA and its provisions with regard to groundwater/aquifers.
While groundwater comprises just 30 percent of all freshwater and 1.7 percent of all water
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on Earth, it is the most important source of water in almost all arid regions.162 It has not
been substantially scrutinized by international law. Arguably, regulations set out in the
UNWC in 1997 are applicable to groundwater usage, as the definitional approach in the
convention describes international watercourses in the composition of groundwater.
However, this inclusion of groundwaters with the water flows leaves out distant major
aquifers, comprising a major amount of water. Furthermore, the drafting of Articles in the
UNWC is tailored to accommodate international watercourses and their respective water
flows. As a result, groundwater remains largely unregulated in the UNWC.163
More particularly, DALTA specifically caters to the management and usage of
groundwater. DALTA was promulgated by the ILC for the specific preservation and
protection of groundwater.164
DALTA meticulously follows the same principles and obligations established in the
UNWC, and applies them to groundwater. For instance, the principles of the equitable
utilization of water, the duty not to harm, the duty to cooperate, the duty to consult
concerned states, the duty not to pollute or harm nature, and the obligation to share
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technical information are all also covered in DALTA.165
Article 4 of DALTA acknowledges the equitable and reasonable utilization of international
aquifers and further recommends sustainable and efficient utilization.166 Similarly, Article
6 obliges states not to harm other international aquifer states,167 Article 7 imposes a duty
to cooperate, and Article 8 obliges states to share technical data and relevant information.168
Moreover, Article 10 urges the protection of the environment and Article 12 obliges states
to prevent, reduce, and control pollution.169 Article 14 forms the obligation to consult for
managerial purposes.170 Finally, Article 16 urges states to cooperate with other states in
regard to all the aforementioned principles and obligations to use peaceful measures to
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resolve a likely conflict.171 Additionally, DALTA provides regulations pertaining to the
recharge and discharge zones of aquifers, to curtail water contamination and the protection
of the environment.172
VIII. IWT V. UNWC
Given the lack of consideration in other treaties of the equitable principles, the
Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, between India and Pakistan, is considered one of the
best treaties regarding water apportionment.173 This treaty incorporated most modern
aspects, with only few exceptions. To measure this, it is relevant to compare the IWT with
the UNWC. This section will analyze the IWT, and it will examine whether the IWT
contains all required aspects that the UNWC or most modern water apportionment treaties
manage to encompass. However, the reason that the UNWC is so generic in its form is
because it was meant to apply to the whole world.174 The IWT was tailored to the needs of
India and Pakistan, which should be kept in mind while assessing the differences between
the instruments.175 Moreover, it is also notable that neither Pakistan nor India has yet
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ratified the UNWC, despite their ongoing water management conflicts, for unknown
reasons.176
A. Scope
The preamble of the IWT provides its scope, which is limited to the governments of
Pakistan and India, with the World Bank a neutral party, brokering the treaty.177
Correspondingly, pertaining to the international watercourses, the IWT only specifies
regulations over six eastern and western rivers, including the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi, and
Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, respectively. Moreover, the IWT also explicitly maintains that
all the lakes and tributaries that contribute to these rivers, also come within its scope.178
On the other hand, UNWC is meant to accommodate all states in the world that share
international watercourses. In this regard, Article 4 of the UNWC states as follows.
1. Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and to
become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire
international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant
consultations.”
2. “A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may be
affected to a significant extent by the implementation of a proposed
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watercourse agreement that applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a
particular project, program or use is entitled to participate in consultations on
such an agreement and, where appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good
faith with a view to becoming a party thereto, to the extent that its use is
thereby affected.179
This wording makes it sufficiently clear that, with regard to international watercourses,
UNWC covers all international waters and all states that share such international waters.
The scope of the UNWC is wider than that of the IWT. Moreover, the IWT only covers six
rivers and two states, whereas the UNWC caters to all international rivers and all states
sharing them. However, it must be noted that the IWT is only a bilateral treaty between
two nations, which was meant to cater to the needs of two states,180 and UNWC is an
international convention, whose purpose was to cover the whole world.181
Moreover, with regard to water usage, there is one very prominent difference between the
IWT and the UNWC. That is, UNWC only deals with nonnavigational uses of water,182
whereas the IWT covers both navigational and nonnavigational uses of water.
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The IWT and the UNWC take a watercourse approach, by which a land contingent with
the watercourses or flows also comes under the scope of this legal framework. Some
countries even imposed reservations with the same term so as to escape the scope, and
sided with the basin approach for water apportionment. In this regard, the IWT clearly
expressed, that “this Treaty governs the rights and obligations of each Party in relation to
the other with respect only to the use of the waters of the Rivers and matters incidental
thereto.”183
The UNWC has set limits to define the scope of the treaty, by which it has an obligation to
include referred watercourses within its scope. The UNWC states that, “[w]here a
watercourse agreement is concluded between two or more watercourse States, it shall
define the waters to which it applies.”184 Further, in its preamble the IWT defined the scope
of its regulations pertaining to watercourses. Therefore, it can be safely ascertained that the
IWT and the UNWC complement each other on the aspect of the scope of the agreement.
B. Principles, Obligations, and Duties
To define the principles of the apportionment of international watercourses, Articles II, III,
and IV of the IWT deal with the eastern and western rivers, and the duties of each party
are set out accordingly. IWT equitably divides the international watercourses and allocates
the three eastern rivers for India’s unrestricted usage, while allowing Pakistan to use the
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waters of the eastern rivers for non-consumptive, domestic, and limited agricultural
purposes.185 Conversely, the IWT allocates the three western rivers for Pakistan’s
unrestricted usage, while allowing India to use the waters of the western rivers for nonconsumptive, domestic, limited agricultural purposes and hydroelectric power.186
However, the IWT also allows India to build water management apparatuses on the western
rivers. This enables India to build storage facilities on the rivers up to “1.25 MAF for
general purposes, 1.6 MAF for power and 0.75 MAF for flood protection.”187
As set out here, the principles of the IWT seem equitable and reasonable when the
superficial understandings suggest that all waters are equally divided among two
neighboring watercourses states, where each nation shares three rivers through the IWT.
But a closer examination of the IWT will portray an entirely different version of these
principles for water apportionment. It is noted that “[t]he three (3) eastern rivers allocated
to India had a cumulative flows of 33 Million Acre Feet (MAF) out of which India was
only utilizing 3 MAF and left with 30 MAF for future expansion. Against this, Pakistan
did not get any additional water and had to develop storages for its future requirements.”188
As a result, it can be safely determined that the underlying principles of the UNWC, which
make it essential to equitably and reasonably share international watercourses, are not
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thoroughly applied and reflected in the IWT.189
Nonetheless, there are many aspects of the basic principles that are followed by the IWT,
reflecting particular obligations and principles promulgated by the UNWC. For instance,
the principle of the obligation not to harm other concerned co-riparian states, established
by the UNWC, is reciprocally accommodated in the IWT.190 Similarly, the duty to notify a
concerned state about planned activities is also notably preserved in the IWT.191
Furthermore, the IWT preserves the obligation to not to pollute or contaminate waters,192
which is identical to the obligation under the UNWC. These reflected obligations and
duties, acting as principles in the IWT, prove that the UNWC and the IWT are in
conformity with each other, essentially satisfying the principles of the equitable and
reasonable utilization of international waters and the obligation not to cause harm.193
Furthermore, the UNWC obliges all watercourse states to cooperate with other concerned
states and thereunder exchange all information on a regular basis, so that management of
water apportionment can be executed effectively.194 Analogously, the IWT also obliges
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both parties to exchange all technical data and information with each other, to make the
other party aware of adverse effects, and to make water management more efficient.195 This
aspect of the IWT is a precise reflection of the obligation under the UNWC, where it is
obligatory to exchange technical information and to cooperate with concerned states.196
However, the IWT does not unreservedly conform to one basic characteristic of the
UNWC. Article 6 of the UNWC provides a list of contingent factors that should be kept in
mind while utilizing international watercourses.197 The IWT does not explicitly provide
such a list of aspects involved in water apportionment, although it does set out some sorts
of rights and try to encompass not all but a few contingent facets of the situation.198 For
instance, the IWT provides procedural arrangements to accommodate financial
transactions between states to construct water management infrastructure.199 This
adjustment within the IWT covers the economic aspect of the situation, which is a
requirement under the UNWC. Similarly, by allowing India to install hydroelectric power
generation plants over the western rivers, IWT furnishes a social aspect of the required
needs.200 Analogously, within its evaluation the IWT covers domestic, industrial, and
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human needs,201 which are mirrored in the UNWC.202 These various aspects of water
apportionment in the IWT reflect various contingent aspects of the UNWC. However,
several other factors enlisted in the UNWC, such as the characteristics of environmental,
population, and climatic aspects of water apportionment, are largely neglected in this
bilateral treaty. Similarly, the obligation to seek the consent of the relevant state after
notification is also not adapted in the IWT.203
C. Devising Institution
The UNWC in its articulation merely suggests that concerned parties can devise a
commission as a mechanism to enforce water management regulations. Article 8 of the
UNWC states that “watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms
or commissions.”204 Article 24 of the UNWC states that “consultations concerning the
management of an international watercourse … may include the establishment of a joint
management mechanism.”205 Analogously, IWT obliges both parties to form a Permanent
Indus Commission, in which both states will have their respective agents to represent
them.206 The IWT further states that this commission is responsible for enforcing the
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regulations of the treaty, and that commissioners are obliged to provide annual reports to
their respective governments.207 Seeing the institutional mechanism of the IWT, it can be
concluded that, in establishing a legal framework, the IWT supersedes the UNWC.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is evident from the discussion above and the principles and obligations that regulations
in international instruments counterbalance the formation of regional instruments.
Considering the wordings of the UNWC and the DALTA, it can be easily comprehended
that the promulgated rules are acclaimed universally, even on the regional stage.208 These
established norms and principles in turn lay the foundation for the formation of treaties and
agreements around the globe.209 Any given instrument largely follows such principles
because the context, intentions, and views of the agreement will adapt to the ambiguities
of agreements or treaties. Comparably, when a regional instrument lacks clarification on
any aspect of a situation, or where there is no instrument to institute regulations, such
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international principles can cater to the required need and operate reasonably, equitably,
justifiably, and impartially.210
As a final note, treaty law and agreements at regional or watercourse level define the true
rules and regulations of any given situation, forming the legal framework within certain
requirements.211 But it is germane to note that international law through multilateral water
treaties is starting to encompass groundwater/aquifers and any tangible or anticipatable
water sharing aspects, along with providing a dispute resolution mechanism and
environmental protection regulations.212 Such instruments cover water conflicts where
there is no mutually agreed treaty. This is also the emerging need of this time, since the
majority of fresh water is not governed by any kind of treaty law.213
So, for regions where there is no agreement, and as a guiding principle for international
law, be it case law or customary law, UNWC and DALTA propose justifiable water
apportionment principles where the underlying principle is that water must be utilized in
an equitable and reasonable manner. Furthermore, this utilization must be undertaken
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without injuring or harming co-riparian states or nature, and while cooperating with
concerned states and restraining from polluting the environment or water.
Correspondingly, although the IWT was formulated decades before the UNWC was
imagined, the IWT provides and covers several aspects of the principles and obligations
later established by the UNWC, such as the principle of the equitable and reasonable
utilization of international watercourses, the obligation not to harm other concerned
riparian state, and the duty to notify other states about planned activities. Nonetheless, there
are certain contingent aspects of water apportionment that are still not reflected in the IWT,
such as the obligation to protect the environment, the population factor, the obligation to
seek consent, and the obligation to prepare EIAs. Nonetheless, the case law pertaining to
the IWT has explicated that the obligation to prepare EIAs is unavoidable.214 On the other
hand, as far as DALTA is concerned, the IWT is silent on the use of freshwater resources
of groundwater/aquifers.
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